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Abstract—We introduce the first known mechanism providing
realtime server location verification. Its uses include enhanc-
ing server authentication (e.g., augmenting TLS) by enabling
browsers to automatically interpret server location informa-
tion. We describe the design of this new measurement-based
technique, Server Location Verification (SLV), and evaluate
it using PlanetLab. We explain how SLV is compatible with
the increasing trends of geographically distributed content
dissemination over the Internet, without causing any new
interoperability conflicts. Additionally, we introduce the notion
of (verifiable) server location pinning within TLS (conceptually
similar to certificate pinning) to support SLV, and evaluate
their combined impact using a server-authentication evaluation
framework. The results affirm the addition of new security
benefits to the existing SSL/TLS-based authentication mech-
anisms. We implement SLV through a location verification
service, the simplest version of which requires no server-
side changes. We also implement a simple browser extension
that interacts seamlessly with the verification infrastructure to
obtain realtime server location-verification results.
1. Introduction
Knowledge of a webserver’s verified geographic location
can provide greater assurance of the webserver’s authentic-
ity, and helps establish the legal jurisdiction under which the
server resides, e.g., in case of disputes. The street address
of a domain owner/operator is typically different than the
location of the physical server hosting its content. If a
server’s geographic location is verified in realtime, a user-
agent (browser henceforth) may, e.g., by virtue of a pre-
established privacy policy, refrain from proceeding with
a connection knowing that the website is hosted from a
suspicious location, or a jurisdiction lacking solid privacy
laws.
Server authentication on the web is primarily achieved
using HTTP over SSL/TLS (or HTTPS) and a distributed
PKI, albeit with questionable trust semantics. A long list of
known problems in that architecture have been identified [1],
[2], raising open-ended questions about the security of the
status-quo [3], [4]. This paper reinforces server authentica-
tion on the web, by weaving the server’s physical location
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information into current authentication mechanisms. This
helps mitigate server impersonation attacks such as phish-
ing [5], pharming [6], and the use of rogue certificates [7]
possibly after a CA compromise.
To achieve such location-based webserver authentica-
tion, we successfully address several challenges. For ex-
ample, because of the increasing physical distribution of
web content (e.g., cloud computing environments, content
distribution networks or CDNs, distributed web-caching
and proxy servers, load balancers, and P2P networks), the
traditional server-client model where an HTTP session is
established entirely between a browser and a single physical
server, and content is downloaded only from that server, is
becoming less common. Web content is often fetched from
several physical/virtual servers, possibly not geographically
collocated. How can useful location information be extracted
from that context to provide assurance of the domain’s
authenticity?
Another challenge is the lack of a practical mechanism
for realtime server location verification. IP-based location
determination is susceptible to location spoofing attacks [8],
making it unsuitable for authentication. Offline location
verification, e.g., a certification authority (CA) verifying the
server’s location at the certificate-issuing time and binding
the issued certificate to the server’s location [9], does not
provide location assurance at time of later interaction with
the server. Additionally, such a solution would require the
domain owner to obtain a certificate for each group of
physically collocated webservers, which is impractical in
both cost and complexity for large providers that may have
thousands of servers around the world (e.g., Akamai [10]).
On the other hand, common delay-based IP geolocation
schemes work in realtime, but are susceptible to delay
manipulation attacks [11]. Prior to the work herein, no
known realtime server location verification mechanism that
accounts for common adversarial location-forging tactics
existed.
To tackle the aforementioned challenges, we introduce
Server Location Verification (SLV)—a measurement-based
realtime server location verification mechanism. Using a
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network of distributed verifiers1 over the Internet, the goal
of SLV is to verify the geographic location of the first
webserver with which the client has a TCP connection.
We explain the design of SLV, and implement a simple
version that requires no server-side changes, which is thus
readily deployable through a browser extension. We also test
SLV’s efficacy from a location verification standpoint, and
analytically evaluate its usage as an additional webserver
authentication mechanism.
The strong assurance SLV provides to the geographic
location of a server adds a new, beneficial dimension to
the current notion of webserver authentication. Comparing
a server’s location to its public key (or certificate), realtime
location verification can be seen as analogous to browser
certificate validation. As introduced herein, server location
pinning (e.g., in the browser) can also model key pinning [3]
to further enhance server authentication. Browsers can cross-
check a server’s verified location in a fashion similar to
multipath probing [12]. A list of physical locations where
a server is hosting its content from can be made publicly
available for realtime consultation (cf. list of active cer-
tificates [1]). Existing certificate revocation primitives can
be extended to revoke a location, e.g., if a data centre
was relocated or if content is no longer distributed from
a previous mirror.
A domain may legitimately have multiple public keys;
primitives such as key pinning and certificate revocation
address that by attempting to recognize whether an already
validated certificate is authentic. Likewise, adopting analo-
gous primitives based on server location is compatible with
legitimately distributing a domain’s content from multiple
geographic locations, e.g., by pinning all such locations, or
actively revoking obsolete locations.
We make the following contributions to enhance server
authentication on the web:
• conceptualizing for the first time how the idea
of physical (geographic) location of a webserver
can be incorporated as an additional dimension to
strengthen server authentication, in a manner com-
patible with but independent of current SSL/TLS
standards;
• designing and implementing SLV, a new
measurement-based algorithm for server location
verification, which in its simplest form requires no
server-side changes nor human-user interactions,
and evaluating its efficacy through pilot experiments
using PlanetLab [13];
• augmenting this new mechanism with browser-
based server-location pinning—a primitive to enable
browsers to establish location-based trust semantics
over time.
In addition to location-based server authentication, ver-
ified server location may provide evidence for services like
1. Verifiers could be regular servers deployed using VMs, on cloud
infrastructure, or physical servers. Third-parties could provide this in
practice, including existing commercial CDN-providers, or as a non-profit
organization.
cloud providers that their servers are in a particular coun-
try [14], e.g., with more favourable data privacy laws than
others, thus gaining a competitive advantage. Likewise, e-
commerce service providers may benefit from assuring their
clients that payments are processed in a country they expect
or are comfortable with.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews traffic hijacking tactics, characteristics of Internet
delay measurements, and the distributed nature of fetching
web content. Section 3 defines the threat model. SLV is
explained in Section 4, followed by server-location pinning
in Section 5. Section 6 empirically tests a prototype im-
plementation of SLV, and evaluates the presented location
verification primitives using a server-authentication evalua-
tion framework. Further discussion is given in Section 7. We
review related work in Section 8 and conclude in Section 9.
2. Background
This section reviews Internet traffic hijacking mech-
anisms, the role of timing measurements in location in-
ference, and mechanisms of content distribution over the
Internet. Readers familiar with this background can proceed
to Section 3.
2.1. Traffic Hijacking: A Network Perspective
Web traffic hijacking is an attack whereby the adversary
impersonates the authentic domain, directing users’ requests
to a machine under the adversary’s control rather than one
under the control of the domain owner.
Hijacking at different levels. Starting by the user initi-
ating a connection to a domain over the Internet, and moving
down the TCP/IP protocol stack, traffic hijacking could be
mounted at every point where a new network addressing
scheme identifying the intended destination is introduced.
Such identifiers include the domain name, IP address, MAC
address, and the switch port that a machine is physically
connected to. Note that at higher layers of the protocol stack,
the notion of an Internet domain is abstracted, and can be
viewed as a single entity. At lower layers, that entity can
become more distributed across multiple physical or virtual
machines. References to an authentic/intended webserver or
machine in what follows denote any such physical or virtual
machines designated by the domain owner to store and offer
the domain’s services/content over the network.
Misleading the user to visit a different (visually similar
or disguised) domain name than the intended one is phish-
ing [5]. Because the identifier here differs at the highest
addressing scheme, subsequent identifiers, namely the IP
address, MAC and port connecting the fraudulent machine
to the network, are expected to be different from that of
the authentic webserver. Similarly, a pharming attack [15]
occurs by misleading the browser-consulted name resolver,
which could be at any level in the DNS hierarchical lookup
procedure, to resolve the domain name to an IP address
assigned to the adversary’s machine. The requested domain
name is thus equal to the intended one, but the IP address
and the remaining identifiers are different from that of the
intended machine(s).
ARP spoofing [16] and BGP spoofing [17] are examples
of traffic hijacking, where an adversary misleads switches
or routers respectively about the network location of the
authentic webserver. Both the domain name and IP address
of the fraudulent machine are the same as that of the
webserver, but the MAC address is different.
Finally, after the switch knows the MAC address of the
intended destination, it looks up its MAC table for the phys-
ical port number where that machine is plugged. Poisoning
the switch’s MAC table [16] causes the adversary to deceive
the switch into forwarding the data to the physical port
where the adversary’s machine is connected, thus hijacking
traffic intended to the authentic machine. In such a case,
the domain name, IP and MAC addresses of the fraudulent
machine match those of the authentic one, but the switch
port number is different.
This background is used later in the threat model, as
summarized in Table 3. Other on-route hijackings are also
possible with other addressing schemes, such as in the Span-
ning Tree Protocol (STP) [18], where switches are assigned
BridgeIDs, or by other injection mechanisms [19].
Hijacking versus MitM. Once traffic is hijacked, the
adversary may itself open another back-end connection to
the authentic domain as a regular user, to present the actual
user with seemingly authentic responses and thus avoid
exposure. The adversary thus becomes a Man-in-the-Middle
(MitM) [20], relaying traffic between the user and the in-
tended domain. Our work herein addresses traffic hijacking
in general, whether it is a hijack-and-host or hijack-and-
relay (MitM).
The role of SSL/TLS. Regardless of where in the net-
work traffic hijacking occurs, HTTPS using SSL/TLS with
a browser-trusted certification authority (CA) is intended to
give assurances about the identity of an authentic domain,
aiming to prevent the adversary from successfully imper-
sonating the authentic domain/webserver. Such successful
impersonation requires not only traffic hijacking, but also
defeating TLS protection mechanisms.
To successfully impersonate an HTTPS-enabled domain,
the adversary either needs to hijack traffic at the highest
addressing level—phishing—or at lower levels, which would
also require other actions such as compromising a browser-
trusted CA to bind the domain name to the adversary’s
private key, compromising the authentic domain’s private
key, or downgrading from HTTPS to HTTP during the
connection establishment time, i.e., SSL stripping [21].
While phishing should technically be the easiest to detect
since all addresses identifying the adversary’s machine differ
from the authentic one, it remains effective as it relies on
social engineering rather than technical manipulations.
For hijacking traffic at lower levels (as noted above),
the Internet’s open PKI system is subject to a single point
of failure; a single CA compromise could jeopardize the
security of the entire system [1]. As such, the system is at
most as secure as the weakest CA. Various enhancing prim-
itives have been proposed, such as certificate pinning [3]
and multipath probing [12], but these aim to strengthen the
current PKI system. In contrast, server location verification
operates orthogonally as an independent webserver authen-
tication dimension.
Other than a CA compromise, previous literature reports
domain operators sharing their private keys among other
constituents [22], which corrupts the system’s key mech-
anism of identity assurance. An adversary with access to
the domain’s private key need not compromise any CA to
mount a successful impersonation attack; this is undetectable
by primitives such as key pinning.
Next, we review characteristics of Internet delays, and
their relationship to geographic locations over the Internet.
2.2. Timing-based Measurements
Literature over the past decade confirms a strong correla-
tion between Internet delays and geographic distances [23],
[24], [25], [26]. Although network routes are subject to
many conditions that may impede such a correlation, like
route circuitousness [27] and delay spikes due to possible
network congestion, the strong correlation remains [28].
This is usually attributed to constantly improving network
connectivity and bandwidth availability [29].
Many networking applications have leveraged this cor-
relation to achieve accurate IP geolocation over the In-
ternet [30], [31], [32]. A common approach is to derive
functions that map delays to distances based on observing
various network characteristics (topology, latency, etc). The
function is then used to map delays measured between mul-
tiple vantage points (with known locations) and the target IP
address to geographic distances, thus constraining the region
where the machine assigned that IP address is physically
present. Measurement-based location techniques can achieve
high accuracy (e.g., a few hundred meters [24]), for infer-
ring geographic information from network measurements.
CPV [33] (see Section 8) was the first measurement-based
technique to verify client location assertions, addressing
an adversarial client aiming to evade [8] geolocation or
manipulate those techniques to its favour [11].
2.3. Fetching Web Content
We review common methods used for dissemination and
delivery of web content.
Content Distribution Networks (CDN). A CDN is a
network of caching servers used to distribute web content
efficiently. CDNs, which have become quite popular, aim
to offload the effort of managing and distributing content
at large scale from the content owner. Different techniques
are used for managing content replication and redirecting
browsers to the appropriate CDN surrogate server.
Liang et al. [22] note two common practices for browser
redirection. The first rewrites the URLs of objects (scripts,
images, etc) to point to their location on the appropriate
CDN server, e.g., using the src HTML attribute. For ex-
ample, to instruct the browser to fetch image.gif from
the CDN server, the webserver uses:
<img src="http://www.cdn-server.com/image.gif">
instead of
<img src="some-local-directory/image.gif">
The second practice resolves the website’s domain name to
the IP address of the respective CDN server, achieved either
by a DNS server under the CDN’s administration configured
as the authoritative name server for the original website,
or by the website’s DNS server itself. In the first practice,
the browser establishes HTTP(S)/TCP connections with the
original server first, and then with the CDN surrogate server;
in the second, the browser only contacts the CDN server
without the need to contact the original server.
Caching and proxy servers. A caching server, sitting
in the middle of the connection between the browser and the
original webserver, terminates the TCP connection intended
between client and webserver, and re-initiates another one
with the webserver. When the caching server receives an
HTTP GET request to a cached object, it sends a conditional
GET request to the original server that includes the header
line If-modified-since specifying the date/version of
the cached object. The server either responds with 304
Not Modified, or with the requested object if the cached
version is stale.
Caching servers can be set up at any point along the
communication path between client and webserver. For ex-
ample, the network administrator could set up a caching
server, and route network traffic to it to reduce external
network usage. An ISP could set-up caching servers to
manage network congestion, and the website operator could
also set up caching servers to reduce load on the main server.
A non-caching proxy is sometimes also used, e.g., for
privacy purposes; the TCP termination hides the client’s IP
address from the webserver. If the client configures its local
machine to use a remote proxy, outbound packets have the
proxy’s IP address as their destination.
Other schemes. Other content distribution schemes
and legitimate browser (re)directs/pointers also exist, such
as browser-based ads, collocated load balancers, fast-flux
servers (see Section 8), authentication servers and P2P
networks. These operate largely similar to the methods re-
viewed above; we omit further discussion for space reasons.
3. Threat Model and Assumptions
Adversary’s objective. The threat model assumes an
adversary aiming to impersonate a webserver by hijacking
its traffic. The adversary’s typical goals are eavesdropping,
or stealing a user’s authentication credentials.
Summary of hijacking mechanisms. To define the
scope of traffic hijacking mechanisms (see Section 2.1)
included in the threat model, Table 1 classifies them by
the subset of adversary’s machine identifiers that would be
equal to that of the authentic machine in each mechanism.
Identifiers include the Domain Name, IP Address, MAC
Address, and Switch port number the machine is connected
to (note that Table 1 is also used in Section 6).
TABLE 1. LEVELS OF TRAFFIC HIJACKING, AND WHETHER EACH CAN
AFFECT A LOCAL AND/OR A GLOBAL SET OF CLIENTS. A CHECK-MARK
( X ) MEANS THE RESPECTIVE TRAFFIC HIJACKING IS INCLUDED IN THE
THREAT MODEL.
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(Human) Phishing X X    
Application Pharming X X    
AS BGP spoofing X    
Yes Network ARP spoofing X F F  Link MAC table poisoning X F F F 
— Physical no network hijacking - -    
The Identifier assigned to the hijacker’s machine is either different from (), or
same as () that of the intended destination or the next hop machine along the
route (F). If the on-route hijacking occurs at the final destination network, then F
are replaced with 
The hijacking level dictates whether an adversary needs
to be on-route between the user and the intended destination.
On-route hijacking, e.g., ARP spoofing and MAC table
poisoning, need not necessarily be mounted at the desti-
nation network where the intended machine is connected;
it may occur at any intermediate network along the route.
If hijacking is mounted at an intermediate network, the
destination IP or MAC addresses of the fraudulent machine
would be equal to that of the router or switch respectively of
the next hop along the route. (Note that the levels in Table 1
differ from the five TCP/IP layers of the protocol stack.)
On-route network hijacking requires the adversary to
locally place itself in one of the intermediate networks,
possibly by compromising a host or switch already part
of that network. Rows 1-3 in Table 1 do not have that
requirement.
Local versus global effect. Note that each hijacking
mechanisms in Table 1 may affect either a global or a
local set of clients. For example, an adversary compromising
the intended domain’s authoritative DNS server itself, can
mount pharming attacks on essentially all clients visiting
that domain; on the other hand, spoofing local DNS res-
olutions affects only a local subset of clients. If spoofed
BGP prefix announcements propagate to large portions of
the Internet, they result in a global effect. Otherwise, their
effect is local to the set of affected networks. For on-route
hijackings, the closer they are to the network of the intended
destination, the more global their effect. For example, ARP
spoofing and MAC table poisoning mounted within the local
network of the intended destination will affect almost all
visiting clients.
Adversarial Capabilities Assumed. The adversary is
capable of hijacking traffic such that its fraudulent machine’s
IP address differs from that of the authentic webserver, i.e.,
Table 1’s first two levels. This covers a set of local hijacking,
including local pharming attacks.
For attacks where the fraudulent machine’s IP address
is equal to that of the authentic destination (i.e., on the AS,
Network and Link levels of Table 1), the threat models
includes global hijacking attacks. This includes the 2008
Pakistani Telecom incident [34] and that of China Telecom
in 2010 [35]. The threat model also encompasses low-
level network hijacks, like ARP spoofing and MAC table
poisoning, mounted within the local network of the intended
destination as it will affect almost all visiting clients—see
Table 1.
The threat model excludes hijacking mechanisms that
satisfy the following two conditions together (the three cells
without X under Local effect in Table 1): (1) they affect only
a local subset of clients and (2) they are conducted on a level
where the IP address of the fraudulent machine is equal
to that of the intended one. An adversary mounting this
class of hijacking can bypass location verification because
the selected verifiers (those used to verify a location, as
explained in Section 4) may not be affected by that locally-
impactful traffic hijacking. Thus, they might end up verify-
ing the location of the authentic machine, as identified by
the client-submitted IP address, vs. the fraudulent one.
The mechanisms presented herein can provide further
assurance to a webserver’s identity in the absence of HTTPS.
The threat model thus assumes an adversary that may or may
not compromise the domain’s SSL/TLS server private key,
or issue a fraudulent certificate possibly by compromising
a browser-trusted CA. The model also addresses the case
of an adversary that can mount SSL stripping attacks [21]
to downgrade a connection, and generally other SSL/TLS-
related attacks. It is assumed that the verifiers are trusted to
carry out and report delay measurements honestly.
4. Server Location Verification
This section introduces the measurement-based Server
Location Verification (SLV) technique. SLV leverages
generic delay measurement guidelines from previous litera-
ture to infer location information from timing analysis [23],
[29], [30]. It is custom-designed to verify Internet webserver
locations.
Location Assertion. There exists no standard mecha-
nism to enable a webserver to assert its geographic loca-
tion to a browser, e.g., no standard HTTP headers convey
that information. For deployability benefits, we rely on IP
geolocation databases [36] for location assertions (these
assertions will be verified by SLV), thus requiring no server-
side changes nor any additional server involvement. These
databases may occasionally have outdated or coarse-grained
IP address location information; webserver provision of an
accurate location assertion, e.g., through HTTP headers,
would thus be beneficial but comes at the cost of server-side
changes. The design of SLV allows alternate more reliable
sources of location assertions.
Location Verification. SLV is designed to verify the
geographic location of the first machine the browser estab-
lishes a TCP connection with. This is the machine assigned
the IP address resulting from the domain name resolution.
Figure 1. System architecture. Parenthesized terms correspond to imple-
mented prototype (Section 4.2)
This enables SLV to address all pharming attacks, regardless
of where in the hierarchical lookup procedure an adversary
may spoof the name resolution; SLV itself does not contact
any DNS systems for name resolutions. If the browser
receives a spoofed IP address via DNS due to a pharming
attack, that IP address is the one passed to SLV for veri-
fication. Accordingly, a fraudulent IP address from a local
pharming attack would be presented to SLV for location
verification.
4.1. Architecture and Algorithm
The system’s architecture is shown in Fig. 1. The SLV
Manager is an independent server acting as an interface
between a browser and the verifiers. A verifier is a ma-
chine, e.g., a virtual private or a cloud-based server, used to
measure Internet delays to a webserver as instructed by the
Manager. The Manager itself runs on top of a webserver,
and has access to a list of distributed verifiers and their
geographic locations. For efficiency, the Manager caches
location verification results; entries for a given IP address
are cached for a configurable period (e.g., a few hours),
before expiring.
Algorithm 1 details the location verification process (see
Table 2 for data structures used). When a user visits a
website, the browser sends the resolved IP address (the
input adrs in Algorithm 1) of the website to the Manager.
By the locate() function in line 4, the Manager obtains the
best available assertion of the server location (the simplest
case may involve using the server’s IP address, e.g., using
IP-to-location mapping databases [37]). The returned result
serves as an unverified assertion of the server’s location.
The Manager then checks for a cached verification result
of that address (see the result structure in Table 2), and
returns it to the browser if the location corresponding to
the IP address has not changed since caching time (e.g., the
IP address was not assigned to another machine somewhere
else).
If no entry was cached, or the cached location is not
equal to the newly asserted one, the Manager begins loca-
tion verification by selecting three verifiers geographically
encompassing the asserted location (line 14). Each verifier
measures the round-trip time (RTT) to the target webserver
and to the other two verifiers (line 15). RTTs are not
measured using standard ICMP-based tools; this avoids QoS
and routing policies at intermediate ASes from artificially
delaying or dropping probing messages, and other known
problems of such techniques [11], [38]. Instead, the verifiers
measure RTTs over the application layer by initiating a TCP
connection to the target server like a regular web client, and
calculating the RTT from the SYN–SYNACK handshake. The
verifiers conduct several RTT measurements, and send the
smallest back to the Manager.
Due to last-mile delays [27], the delay-to-distance ratio
is inflated near the edge networks of two communicating
parties over the Internet. Such inflation occurs four times
while measuring the RTTs between a pair of verifiers and
the webserver (i.e., twice between each verifier and the
webserver). On the other hand, RTTs are inflated only twice
when measured directly between a pair of verifiers. As such,
we filter out the inflation factor by subtracting a value, λ,
from the three RTT measurements between each verifier and
the webserver. In practice, the value of λ may be calibrated
in realtime, e.g., as the average RTT between all verifiers
in the region and their network gateway. Extensive delay
analysis in previous literature found the network edge causes
a delay inflation equivalent to ∼5ms [24]. We use this value
in our prototype implementation (see Section 4.2).
After subtracting λ, the Manager stores the delay in-
formation in a two-dimensional array D, in line 15, such
that D[v][i] is verifier v’s measured RTT between itself and
entity i; i is either another verifier or the target webserver.
Geometric Verification. By Thales’ theorem [39], an
inscribed triangle with one side being the diameter of the
prescribing circle is a right-angled triangle, with the diam-
eter its diagonal (Fig. 2). SLV verifies location assertions
using this, where times are treated as distances consistently
for a given pair of verifiers at a given instant in time; the
asserted location is positively verified if, for any of the three
pairs of the selected verifiers, the sum of the squared RTTs
between each verifier and the target webserver does not
exceed the square of the average RTT between the pair,
i.e.,
(D[v1][ip])2 + (D[v2][ip])2 ≤
(
D[v1][v2] +D[v2][v1]
2
)2
(1)
Figure 3 shows an example webserver encapsulated by a
triangle determined by three verifiers. The webserver is
inside the two circles whose diameters are delimited by
verifiers [A,B] and [A,C]. If the measured RTTs of one
of those pairs of verifiers support the webserver’s presence
inside the respective circle, i.e., inequality (1) above holds,
this circle becomes the verification granularity. The Manager
ALGORITHM 1: Location verification run by the Manager. See
Table 2 for data types, and inline for explanation.
Inputs
C[.]: An array of result cached at the Manager
adrs: A string of the server’s IP address
Output:
res: A structure of verification result
begin
1 Declare ip of type IP_info
2 Declare res of type result
3 ip.value := adrs
4 ip.loc := locate(adrs)
5 if ip.value exists in C then
6 res := C[ip.value]
7 if res.ip.loc = ip.loc then
8 return res
9 res.ip := ip
10 res.when veri := local time at the Manager
11 Declare circ of type circle
12 T := the set of triangles geographically encompassing
ip.loc
13 foreach t in T do
14 V := the three verifiers determining t
15 D := RTTs between the verifiers in V and ip
16 foreach verifier pair [v1, v2] in V do
17 circ.centre := mid point(v1, v2)
18 circ.radius := distance(v1, v2)/2
19 if RTTs in D indicate ip inside circ then
20 res.veri passed := true
21 res.region := circ
22 C := C ∪ res
23 return res
24 res.veri passed := false
25 res.region := null
26 C := C ∪ res
27 return res
TABLE 2. STRUCTURE OF EXCHANGED MESSAGES
Struct Attribute Data Type Description
result
ip IP_info
See IP_info
below
veri passed boolean
Verification
result
region circle
Verification
granularity
when veri timestamp
Date and time of
last verification
IP_info
value string
IP Address e.g.,
“1.2.3.4”
loc location
See location
below
circle
centre location
Centre of a circle
(See location
below)
radius double
Radius of the
circle (e.g., in
km)
location
lat double Latitude
lon double Longitude
Figure 2. Thales’ theorem [39] is used herein for server location ver-
ification. It states that for an inscribed triangle (as shown), the angle
∠ABC = 90◦
Figure 3. Example using Thale’s theorem (map data: Google, INEGI).
Each pair of verifiers determines a unique circle whose centre is the
midpoint between both verifiers, and radius is half the distance between
them. Because server X is geographically inside the circle determined
by the pair [A,B], it follows from Thales’ theorem (see Fig. 2) that
AX2 +XB2 ≤ AB2. Similarly for the circle determined by [A,C].
then signs and sends the verification response to the browser,
along with the centre and radius of the circle (lines 17
and 18), and caches the result for that IP address. If the
verification result is negative for all three circles, a new
encompassing triangle determined by three different verifiers
is selected. That process is repeated (line 13) until (a) the
location is positively verified, or (b) the verifiers of all
triangles (or a sufficient subset thereof) encompassing the
asserted location are exhausted. In our experiments (see
Section 6), typically about four triangles suffice for this
test. In (b), a negative verification result is returned, and
the granularity field (region) is set to null (line 25). The
justification for a positive verification from a single triangle
being deemed sufficient to pass location verification is that
RTT delays have a lower bound restricted by the spanned
geographic distance (data flows in fibre at two-thirds the
speed of light [40]).
Caching. For efficiency, the system employs two layers
of caching: one at the browser and another at the Manager.
The former is per browser instance, and is cleared when the
browser process terminates. Browser caching is useful as
it helps when the user switches between tabs or refreshes a
page. A cached entry is as simple as a tuple of <IP address,
verification decision>. Note that results are cached by IP
address, not domain name. Thus, a page refresh that results
in a different non-cached IP address upon resolving its
domain causes the browser to resend the new IP address for
verification. This makes the browser check the webserver’s
location if the domain’s resolved IP address changes.
The caching at the Manager is more persistent. A cached
entry is also addressable by IP address, but formatted dif-
ferently as: <IP address, asserted location, verification date
and time, verification result, centre, radius>. The last two
entries are the centre and radius of the circle delineating the
verification granularity, if the location was positively veri-
fied, and null otherwise. Because the Manager’s caching
is centralized, i.e., relative to the browsers’ local caching, a
browser is likely to get an instant response from the Manager
as more verification requests to the Manager are made by
an increasing number of relying clients.
4.2. Implementation
In our prototype implementation (see Fig. 1), we used
Apache as our webserver, PHP for the Manager, MySQL for
the Manager’s caching, and Java for the verifiers. The com-
munication between Manager and verifiers uses standard
TCP sockets. The Manager learns about the m available
verifiers using a simple csv-formatted file with m lines and
3 entries per line: the verifier’s IP address, its geographic
latitude, and longitude. We used m = 20 PlanetLab nodes as
verifiers in our testing (see Section 6), which were situated
in the US. For IP address location lookups, we used the
ipinfo2 DB.
Browser extension. On the browser side, we imple-
mented a Mozilla Firefox extension to submit the website’s
IP address to the Manager, and process a response. We
used jQuery to receive verification results from the Manager
asynchronously. Verification responses are cached locally
by the browser, independent of the caching layer on the
Manager, to avoid re-consulting the Manager on page re-
freshes and tab-switches. The extension also implements
server location pinning, as explained below.
5. Pinning of Server Location
We introduce the idea of (verifiable) server location
pinning, following the idea of certificate pinning [3]; as
such, we first quickly review certificate pinning. Certificate
pinning is one approach3 introduced in the SSL/TLS ecosys-
tem to reduce the user’s required interpretation of cues and
decision making, shifting that responsibility to the browser.
A website’s certificate is pinned (or saved) in the browser,
such that future certificates presented by the website are
cross-checked against the saved one, with non-matches typ-
ically raising suspicion. A domain’s certificate can be pinned
in the browser or in DNS records [41]. A browser can pin
certificates (1) automatically as the user browses the web,
(2) when instructed by the server, e.g., through HPKP [42],
or (3) when preloaded with pinned certificates. Note that
non-DNS based methods (1) and (3) do not require server-
side changes, and can thus be immediately deployed through
browser extensions.
2. http://ipinfo.io/
3. Other items could be pinned, such as the public key value.
We put forward the principle of server location pinning.
A set of expected server locations (e.g., geo-coordinates) is
saved locally (by one of several means explained below) by
the user’s browser for future cross checking. When a website
is then visited and its location is verified (see Section 4), the
browser checks if the verified location falls within any of the
pre-pinned regions. The action upon a failed check can then
be handled by, e.g., a pre-specified policy. Such a policy
might handle three possible pinning-validation outcomes, as
we explain below: Critical, Suspicious and Unsuspicious.
The policy mechanism is outside of the scope herein. How-
ever, a simple intuitive policy could instruct the browser to
refrain from any connection with login forms or financial
transactions in case of Critical or Suspicious outcomes; in
the absence of login forms and financial transactions, the
browser drops the connection only in the case of a Critical
outcome.
Since the geographic locations where a website is hosted
from could change frequently for some websites (e.g., due
to different content distribution architectures as explained
in Section 2.3), server-side cooperation can provide the
benefit of dictating which geographic locations should be
pinned. This could be, for example, in the form of (1)
a publicly queryable set of websites and their locations,
which can also provide the benefit of quick location updates;
(2) realtime location pinning instructions possibly in the
form of HTTP headers created by the webserver itself;
and (3) incorporating server location updates into DNS.4
These examples respectively can be viewed as conceptually
analogous to trusted directories or Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) [1], HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)
[42], and DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
(DANE) [41] in the SSL/TLS ecosystem.
Location Pinning Algorithm. Locations are pinned as
an array P of the data structure shown in Table 3. The array
is referenced by the domain name (name). The attribute ips
is an array of IP addresses that name (i.e., domain name)
has previously resolved to. regs is an array of geographic
regions, each described as a centre and radius of a circle,
where the domain name was verified to be hosted from.
rmax is the upper limit on the number of allowed server
locations (e.g., dictated by the domain operator).
Algorithm 2 details the server location pinning mech-
anism. When a location verification response is received
from the SLV Manager (see Section 4), the browser first
searches P for a previously pinned location entry for the
corresponding domain name. If none is found (line 23), the
browser either pins the domain’s location if it was verified,
or reacts to a Suspicious outcome as specified by the policy
if location verification fails. If a pinned location is found
but location verification has failed, it is a Critical outcome.
Assuming the browser had previously pinned server
locations for that domain, and that the domain’s IP address is
verified (line 7), the browser checks if the domain’s asserted
location falls within any of the pinned regions for that
4. DNS location records (LOC) were initially proposed as a means of
disseminating IP-address location information [43].
ALGORITHM 2: Server location pinning in the browser.
Inputs
P[.]: An array of pinned domain locations
d: Domain in question
r: Verification result of Algorithm 1
Goal
To enable the browser to establish location-based trust
semantics over time.
begin
1 outcome :=Unsuspicious
2 if d exists in P then
3 pin := P[d]
4 if r.veri passed = false then
5 outcome :=Critical
6 else
7 found := false
8 foreach region in pin.regs do
9 l := dist(r.ip.loc, region.centre)
10 if l ≤ region.radius then
11 found := true
12 if r.ip.value exists in pin.ips then
13 pin.ips[r.ip.value].loc := r.ip.loc
14 else
15 pin.ips := pin.ips ∪ r.ip
16 pin.when veri := r.when veri
17 break
18 if found = false then
19 if size of pins.regs < pin.rmax then
20 pin.ver regs :=
pin.ver regs ∪ r.ver regs
21 else
22 outcome :=Critical
23 else if r.veri passed = true then
24 Declare x as a pinning struct (see Table 3)
25 x.name := d
26 x.ips := pin.ips ∪ r.ip
27 x.ver regs := pin.ver regs ∪ r.ver regs
28 x.when veri := r.ver
29 x.when pin :=local time at the browser
30 P := P ∪ x
31 else
32 outcome :=Suspicious
33 return outcome
TABLE 3. STRUCTURE OF PINNED LOCATIONS FOR A DOMAIN (SEE
TABLE 2)
Attribute Data Type Description
name string The domain name
ips[.] IP_info
An array of the domain’s saved IP
addresses
ver regs[.] circle
An array of the domain’s verified
regions
rmax Integer
Upper limit on the number of
allowed server locations
when veri timestamp Date and time of last verification
when pin timestamp Date and time of pinning
domain. If it does, the browser either updates the IP ad-
dress’s corresponding stored geographic locations, or if the
IP address was seen for the first time for that domain, adds
it to the array of IP addresses corresponding to the domain
name. If the asserted location does not fall within any of the
pinned locations (but was positively verified), the browser
adds it to the pinned domain as a new region only if more
regions are allowed for that domain (line 20). Otherwise, the
new asserted location, despite being successfully verified, is
classified as a Critical outcome.
Note this algorithm does not place any restrictions on
the number of IP addresses allowed per domain. The restric-
tion is only on the number of different geographic regions
(rmax) where content is initially provided. In practice, the
value rmax might be set and announced by each domain
operator.
6. Evaluation
We evaluate SLV in two stages. First, we establish the
conceptual validity of the measurement-based location ver-
ification technique itself from a networking perspective, by
attempting to verify websites with known locations using a
prototype implementation. Second, we evaluate the benefits
of combining this with server location pinning to augment
server authentication mechanisms.
6.1. Evaluating Measurement-based SLV
Our pilot testing uses PlanetLab [13], employing as
verifiers 20 testbed nodes distributed in North America.
We measure the false reject (FR) and false accept (FA)
rates when using the described SLV approach to verify
server location assertions. As such, we test SLV by verifying
locations of servers in which we have available ground truth
about their geographic locations. We followed the assump-
tion that university websites are hosted on-campus [24], thus
we can use their posted street addresses as our approxima-
tion for their webserver locations. See below on verifying
this assumption.
Note that regardless of the content-distribution scheme
employed in practice by a website (cf. Section 2.3), a
browser always downloads content from one or more phys-
ical or virtual server(s). We focus here on SLV’s feasibility
to provide measurement-based location assurance to the
server currently being contacted (as explained in Section 4),
whether that server is standalone or part of a larger dis-
tribution network (e.g., a CDN). University servers with
known ground-truth locations thus suffice for our evaluation
purpose.
6.1.1. False Rejects. We randomly selected 94 university/-
college websites for testing, and excluded 11 of these that
simple filtering found to be hosted by a cloud or a CDN,
lacking ground truth knowledge of their true geographic
locations. The filtering involved looking up from public reg-
istries, the AS from which the domain is reachable. As Ta-
ble 4 shows, two of the 83 remaining domains were falsely
TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF PILOT EVALUATION RESULTS.
Tot
al
Ac
cep
ted
Re
jec
ted
FR
/FA
True assertions 83 81 2 2.4% FR∗
False assertions 100 0 100 0% FA
∗See inline for an explanation of the results
rejected; these both fell in a region deficient in verifiers. In
exploring this, we found one involved verifier (PlanetLab
node) which contributed to both FRs was extremely slow,
including in responsiveness to running commands/processes,
thus presumably suffering technical problems. From this
initial study, we know how to reduce the FR rate below 2.4%
(i.e., by testing the reliability of verifier nodes in advance),
but reporting this initial result highlights the importance of
a responsive and sufficient verification infrastructure.
6.1.2. False Accepts. To evaluate FAs, the SLV Manager
was manually configured to select triangles not encapsu-
lating the asserted locations, and far enough away to have
the asserted location outside the three circles determined
by each pair of verifiers, as explained in Section 4. The
expectation is that the false location assertion will be cor-
rectly rejected. Four triangles were randomly chosen for
each tested domain. The verifiers determining each of four
triangles must reject presence inside the respective circles
for a reject decision to result; the parameter four was
empirically determined, and is subject to adjustment. Again,
domains were chosen randomly from among those for which
we had ground truth knowledge of webserver location.
One hundred domains were chosen in the following
manner: 40 in Europe, 20 in eastern Asia, 20 in Latin
America, and 20 in Oceania. As summarized in Table 4,
none of the tested domains was falsely accepted. The false
accept rate of 0% is not intended to claim perfection, but
rather is an artifact of limited preliminary testing.
6.2. Evaluation with Server Location Pinning
Table 5 uses a webserver-authentication evaluation
framework almost identical (in columns) to that developed
by Clark et al. [1]. The column headers show the evaluation
criteria, and the rows are the enhancement primitives.
Baseline HTTPS. To identify new benefits relative to
the standard HTTPS defense mechanism, we first evaluate
HTTPS itself as a baseline for comparison. Row 0 was not
required in the work of Clark et al. [1], which specifically
evaluated SSL/TLS-enhancements. In our row 0, all com-
parative evaluation criteria, such as No New Trusted Entity
and No Extra Third Party, are relative to regular HTTP (non-
HTTPS); the other rows are rated relative to row 0. HTTPS
provides the first three security properties in Table 5 but
only partially, in light of the recent community awareness
of critical HTTPS weaknesses and real-world attacks [7],
[44], [45]. The attack surface includes CA compromise, SSL
stripping, implementation vulnerabilities, misconfiguration,
and reliance on users to make security decisions.
TABLE 5. EVALUATION OF LOCATION-BASED PRIMITIVES TO AUGMENT WEBSERVER AUTHENTICATION. • DENOTES THE PRIMITIVE PROVIDES THE
CORRESPONDING BENEFIT (COLUMN); ◦ DENOTES PARTIAL BENEFIT; AN EMPTY CELL DENOTES ABSENCE OF BENEFIT. THE SHADED ROW (INDEXED
0), WHICH IS ITSELF RATED COMPARED TO REGULAR HTTP, SERVES AS THE BASELINE FOR COMPARATIVELY ASSESSING IMPROVEMENTS OR
RETROGRESSION OF THE NEW PRIMITIVES DETAILED HEREIN (ROWS 1-6).
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Security Properties Offered Beneficial Properties
Primitive A B C Security/Priv Deployability Usability
0 Standard HTTPS ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • •
1 SLV without location pinning • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • ◦ •
2 Server loc. pinning (Client History) ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • • • •
3 Server loc. pinning (Server) ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • • • •
4 Server loc. pinning (Preloaded) • • • • ◦ • • ◦ • • • ◦ •
5 Server loc. pinning (DNS) • • • • ◦ • • ◦ • • • ◦ •
6 List of expected locations • • • • • • • •
Basic HTTPS relies on trusting CAs and signed cer-
tificates for server authentication, and thus lacks bullets at
No New Trusted Entity and No New Auth’n Tokens. While
not introducing new traceability avenues, it does not reduce
traceability because revocation methods, such as OCSP re-
sponders, are still required for revocation. It requires servers
to obtain certificates, thus lacks No Server-Side Changes.
Finally, HTTPS lacks all three usability properties relative
to HTTP.
SLV. For the security properties, SLV (row 1) provides
both the benefit of detecting global MitM attacks, regardless
of how the adversary hijacks traffic (recall Section 2.1), and
of detecting a subset of local hijacks (column 2 in Table 5),
including local pharming attacks. As noted in Section 3, if a
local ARP spoofing or local BGP prefix hijacking occurs, the
selected verifiers will not be affected and will thus attempt
to verify the location of a machine that is different from the
fraudulent one communicating with the client.
Leaking client credentials (column 3) and TLS stripping
(column 5) require the adversary to conduct traffic hijacking
first, and SLV provides partial protection if that hijacking
was locally conducted (column 2). Thus, SLV offers a partial
benefit (◦) in both situations. The Affirms POST-to-HTTPS
benefit prevents submitting POST requests over HTTP; SLV
does not provide that benefit.
In terms of the impact to HTTPS, no new authentication
tokens are introduced by SLV since the verification results
are sent to requesting clients automatically and in realtime.
For deployability, SLV with assertions based on IP-address
to location lookup tables requires no server-side changes,
and can be deployed without DNSSEC. It provides the
benefit of Internet Scalable because the location verification
process is fully automatable (unlike, e.g., certificate preload-
ing, where requests are manually reviewed [3]). However,
the benefit is graded as only partial because the required
verification infrastructure, such as the verifiers, grows as the
need for location verification increases. Finally, SLV pro-
vides the benefit of signalling the status completely because
all browsed servers’ locations are sent to the Manager (see
Section 4) for verification, i.e., server participation is not
optional.
Note that the nature of communication between a
browser and the SLV Manager is similar to that of the SSL
multipath probing primitive [12], and thus their beneficial
properties (row 6) are similar (cf. [1]).
Location Pinning Alternatives. Server location pinning
is conceptually similar to key/certificate pinning, and thus
any of the four methodologies (see rows 2-5 in Table 5)
could be adopted for the server’s location. For example, just
as public keys could be pinned with DNS records, servers’
geographic locations can be likewise. In fact, the DNSLOC
records were proposed experimentally in 1996 [43] for non-
adversarial location assertion purposes. In conclusion, eval-
uation outcomes of location pinning primitives are similar
to those of key pinning (cf. [3]).
Note that the benefits No New Entity, No New Traceabil-
ity, No New Authentication Tokens, and No Extra Third Party
are provided by (some of) the location pinning primitives,
but not SLV (row 1). For example, for No New Traceability,
the pinning process itself, including checking verification
results against already pinned locations, does not introduce
new traceability (e.g., if the location verification results
were already cached). An analogous argument applies to
the remaining three benefits.
List of Expected Locations. Domain owners can main-
tain a publicly accessible list of geographic locations where
a client should expect the server offering their content. This
is analogous to maintaining a list of active certificates [1]
(e.g., Certificate Transparency [4]) to facilitate revocation
simply by removing the revoked certificate from the list,
and may thus aid in location revocation.
7. Discussion
When SSL/TLS is not available for a domain, e.g., if not
supported or because of an SSL stripping attack, the location
verification mechanism presented herein offers an important
means (independent of SSL/TLS) for detecting fraudulent
server authentication. Nonetheless, verified location infor-
mation is best combined with SSL/TLS, to provide an ad-
ditional authentication dimension. This becomes especially
useful in cases where certificate validation is suspicious,
e.g., when the browser is presented a self-signed certificate,
an insecure/outdated cipher suite, or an HTTPS page with
mixed content [22].
The tree diagram in Fig. 4 shows how location-based
server authentication can complement SSL to reduce the
likelihood of successful attacks. The dashed lines indicate
parts contributed by the presented primitives; they highlight
scenarios where traffic hijacking and/or MitM may go unde-
tected without SLV, but would instead be mitigated if SLV
is used.
From a user’s perspective, we believe that, even with-
out requiring any new user actions, it can be useful for
some users to see in which country a server is located—
whether this information is verified by SLV or just asserted
by any browser plugin, e.g., flagfox (see Section 8). In a
phishing attack, if the adversary obtains a valid certificate
for a spoofed domain, standard visual browser cues will
show green locks, and positively assuring symbols [46]. A
country’s flag or a displayed world map will however differ
from expectations (i.e., when the adversary’s fraudulent
machine is hosted remotely). There may be higher potential
to attract user notice when such a location indicator conveys
intuitively meaningful information (e.g., the country flag or
city where the server is) rather than cryptic symbols—a
green lock, or an exclamation mark on a grayed out triangle,
etc. This case is similar to that where a browser-trusted CA
is compromised and no certificates are pinned for the victim
domain. On the other hand, location verification provides
that missing benefit of signaling such an adversarial situation
using an intuitively meaningful visual cue; e.g., the browser
will either display an unexpected flag if the asserted country
is different from that of the authentic server, or depending
on implementation choices, show a struck out flag in case
the location fails verification.
Note that several useful features can be built on top of
server location verification. For instance, SLV can benefit
from a policy-based mechanism [12], [47] that customizes
how a browser automatically handles various transactions
based on their location [48]. An instruction could be of
the form allow credit card transactions only at this set of
countries or deny email logins in that set of locations. This
may also help control fraud and deter phishing attacks, ide-
ally requiring no new user actions or decisions whatsoever.
Also, any of several known mechanisms could be employed
to help the system’s scalability and efficiency (cf. [49]).
For example, the verifiers (acting as regular clients) could
proactively measure delays periodically (e.g., to high-runner
websites) to reduce verification time.
Figure 4. Decision tree for detection of traffic hijacking attacks. As ex-
plained in Section 3, from the server’s perspective, phishing is a class of
traffic hijacking. Dashed lines indicate attacks detected only by the new
mechanisms presented herein.
8. Related Work
GeoPKI. GeoPKI [9] is a location-aware PKI system
that associates certificates to geographic spaces, e.g., land or
property boundaries. A certificate contains a high granularity
definition of the space to which it is associated. This could
be in the form of GPS coordinates along with lateral and
longitudinal distances that accurately delineate the space
boundaries. To claim a space, the owner submits their space-
defined certificate (self-signed or CA-signed) to a public log
(e.g., similar to certificate transparency [4]), and monitors
the log to detect any other entity claiming ownership of their
space. To validate a space ownership, GeoPKI relies on CA-
issued Extended Validation (EV) certificates, associated to
a real world street address. An attacker would thus need to
either compromise a CA to issue an EV certificate to tie its
public key to the fraudulently-claimed space, or forge legal
documents proving such ownership.
The goals and threat model of GeoPKI differ from
those we address herein. GeoPKI provides no indication
or assurance of the location of the actual server a client is
connected to.5 Additionally, no realtime location verification
mechanism is involved, thus a compromised CA remains a
threat. With SLV, compromising a CA alone is insufficient;
the attacker must also evade SLV to succeed in a MitM
attack.
Client Presence Verification. CPV [33] verifies geo-
graphic location claims of Internet clients. Client locations
5. A client could be connected to a webserver in China, legally owned
and operated by an entity in the US. The GeoPKI EV certificate then
validates the US location, with no user awareness of the physical server’s
location.
are corroborated based on triangular areas derived from
delay measurements. While this enables CPV to verify client
locations with high granularity, its verification process suf-
fers occasional Triangular Inequality Violations (TIVs) [50].
In contrast, while SLV selects verifiers forming triangles, it
does not verify server presence within them, nor use triangu-
lar areas; its use of Thales’s theorem avoids TIVs entirely,
and reduces the number of delay measurements required
between verifiers and the webserver. SLV also provides
assurance to clients about server locations (note that servers
and clients differ fundamentally in many factors, including
that a third party location verification service provider can
easily get clients to run code, e.g., using JavaScript as
CPV does; this is not applicable when verifying geographic
locations of webservers).
Geolocating fast-flux servers. Delay-based geolocation
of fast-flux hidden webservers has been proposed [51];
hidden behind proxies, their IP addresses are not known to
the client. When geolocating a webserver, the geolocation
service provider can first detect that the webserver is hidden
behind a proxy by noticing a large difference between the
RTTs measured on the network layer (e.g., using ping) and
the application layer (e.g., using an HTTP GET). To estimate
the hidden server’s location, a group of landmarks measure
application layer RTTs to the server, which are then used
to obtain rough estimates to the direct RTTs between the
landmarks and the hidden server (excluding the proxy). The
RTTs are then mapped to distances to constrain the region
of the hidden server relative to the landmarks [29].
Such a geolocation mechanism aims at disclosing an in-
consistency between the geographic location of the sever ter-
minating the TCP connection and the one processing HTTP
requests. SLV does not attempt to determine webserver
locations, but rather verifies the plausibility of the webserver
within an asserted region. While attempts to evade SLV may
include hiding the attacker’s IP address behind a proxy, SLV
handles that attack differently—it reports that the asserted
location (that of the IP address seen by the client) is not
verified.
Flagfox extension. Flagfox is an example6 Firefox ex-
tension that looks up the countries of webserver IP addresses
as a user browses the Internet, and displays the country flag
in the URL bar. The flag is based on the tabulated location
of the IP address, not the country TLD in the domain
name. Flagfox uses Maxmind’s IP database for geolocation,7
and does not employ any location verification mechanism.
Since locations obtained by tabulation-based techniques are
falsifiable [8], e.g., by the IP address owner, they are unreli-
able in adversarial environments. For instance, an adversary
aiming to impersonate the University of Tennessee’s website
(e.g., through phishing, pharming or a MitM attack) could
register the IP address assigned to its malicious webserver
to be in Knoxville, Tennessee. Indeed, a previous study [30]
found that most of Google’s IP addresses are reported by
6. Other extensions exist with similar objectives.
7. https://www.maxmind.com
the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN)8 to
be physically located in Mountain View, California; such
clearly incorrect assertions have been proven wrong [30].
9. Concluding Remarks
The server location verification mechanism detailed
herein does not conflict with the web’s growing trend of
distributed content dissemination and geographically diverse
replicated caching. The initial front-end server to which
a client connects is the port of entry to the distribution
infrastructure, if one is being used; paying more attention
to that server, e.g., by verifying its physical presence in
a known/expected geographic location as explained herein,
provides information often relevant to the target domain’s
authenticity. Thus, SLV works regardless of the distribu-
tion and architecture of such infrastructure. Additionally,
depending on a client’s location, a finite set of n such “ports
of entry” are typically expected for any single domain, and
that set is often stable. Pinning several server locations (see
Section 5) is thus beneficial for new and verified locations.
Despite efforts from the security community to address
shortcomings in the SSL/TLS ecosystem, PKI compromise
still admits MitM attacks, e.g., due to slow or non-adoption
of primitives like key pinning, or user inability to reliably
react to visual browser cues. The proposals herein con-
stitute a new and parallel server authentication dimension
augmenting SSL/TLS (e.g., comparable to client multi-
factor authentication), relying not on the standard something
you have principle (namely, the server private key), but
in addition where you are. While the general notion of
location-based authentication is known, the novelty herein
is the measurement-based mechanism itself which verifies
server locations in realtime, in a manner compatible with
SSL/TLS authentication, and without requiring human-user
involvement in decision making.
To mount a successful MitM attack when SLV is used,
the adversary must, in addition to compromising the SS-
L/TLS infrastructure, co-locate its malicious (possibly vir-
tual) machine in the geographic vicinity of the authentic one.
This places a heavy set of burdens, including an attack cus-
tomized to the location of each target server. A mechanism
like SLV thus compels the adversary to make a true assertion
about the location of its fraudulent servers, both divulging
the fraudulent servers’ true geographic location, and forcing
the adversary to operate in the geographic vicinity of the
authentic webserver—often a region in a more familiar
country, or with more favourable laws and accountability
measures.
SLV leverages established networking principles that
location information can be inferred from timing measure-
ments, and existing methodological guidelines for use of
timing measurements to achieve server location verification.
While large-scale evaluation of SLV’s verification process is
not the main focus of this paper, preliminary experiments
highlight the algorithm’s efficacy in verifying webservers’
8. http://whois.arin.net
geographic locations, by means immediately deployable
through a browser extension without requiring webserver
modifications.
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